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A NEW ZEALAND ORAL HISTORY 
Abstract: This report presents results of research on the failure of 
the inflation accounting standard in New Zealand. Presentation of 
the results in three narratives highlights that any such research is a 
series of interlocking and overlapping events, and that narrative is a 
direct and efficient means of communicating both causal and trans-
actional components which contributed towards the outcomes. Iso-
lation of the three narratives was chosen to demonstrate that it is 
not useful to extol an explanatory or interpretative paradigm for 
accounting history if it is advocated at the expense of sequential 
accounts of events. 
To undertake an oral history project in accounting is to be 
immersed in narratives of those to whom the microphone is 
directed. As researchers listen and then transcribe, they imbue 
resonances and drama, even trauma, from accounting events as 
experienced by their group of interviewees, to the point when 
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debate on narrative and counternarrative [Funnell, 1998] seems 
unrelated to the day-to-day problems of recording, transcrip-
tion, analysis, and writing up. However, acting on the proposal 
by Funnell [1998, p. 144] that "to comprehend the constitutive 
effect of the narrative is to open the prospect for liberation 
from our sanctioned and settled past," the following report of 
this oral history research project was isolated into three narra-
tives. The separation illuminates the constitutive power of nar-
rative in accounting history and, from such illumination, an 
advocacy of the utility and role of narrative. 
One aspect of narrative analyses in literary studies is the 
identification of hegemonic forces which influence, shape, and 
order the meanings of events and the manner of remembrance. 
There are exemplary studies in other disciplines, such as the 
analysis by Landau of "Human Evolution as Narrative" [1984] 
in which was presented an analysis of narrative used in ac-
counts of human evolution, utilizing established methods of 
analysis of folk stories. Just as explanations of human evolution 
inevitably utilize narrative and can be analyzed using literary 
methods, so also research histories can be analyzed as struggles 
for success, with both malevolent and benevolent powers driv-
ing events outside the control of individuals. 
In this case of the debate about current cost accounting 
(CCA) and the introduction of "inflation accounting standards," 
the hegemonic process is one whereby the interests of other 
groups (account preparers and users) are coordinated with 
those of the dominant group. However, hegemony, as a social 
process, is continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged 
[Brow, 1990, p. 1]. The failure of the CCA standard is one ex-
ample of such resistance; ultimately, it delineated limitations 
on the standard-setters' power. It is inevitable to the normative 
nature of standard setting that the process should produce 
standards which could fail. A failure in the standard-setting 
process can be clearly understood when a narrative structure 
identifies the significance of different events in the process of 
resistance and change. Added to this are the perceptions of 
those involved who, with the benefit of hindsight and contem-
plation, provide their own accounts of the failure which pro-
vides an understanding of events different from analyses of the 
causes of failure based on reasons in company reports. 
THE FIRST NARRATIVE: THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The first narrative relates the story of the research, why 
and how it was developed and the methods used. This introduc- 2
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tion ensures that other scholars may gain sufficient information 
not only to judge the results of the research but also to apply or 
extend these methods if they are deemed beneficial. 
The failure of the CCA standard was chosen as an oral 
history subject because the 1982 promulgation of the CCA 
standard was rejected on a scale unprecedented within New 
Zealand's generally "obedient" accounting community. 
The failure of current cost accounting standards has been 
subject to scrutiny elsewhere. For U.K. events see Tweedie and 
Whittington [1984] and Pong and Whittington [1996], while a 
summary of continuing developments in Australia in the use of 
current value accounting is provided by Jones and Love [1995]. 
Compliance with the standard in New Zealand was less 
than ten percent of listed company reports over the two to three 
years of financial reports studied [Peterson et al., 1984]. Unlike 
other countries, the resistance was not so much from practi-
tioners as much as companies and their boards, largely at-
tributed at the time to the lack of acceptability for tax purposes 
[Peterson et al., 1984]. Eventually, in October 1985, the stand-
ard was dropped. It went out with a whimper, not a bang; yet, 
these events still continue to impact the development of ac-
counting in New Zealand. 
The resonance of this event is such that it is ideally suited 
for oral h is tory research . Jus t as the orally t r a n s m i t t e d 
whakapapa of the Maori1 in New Zealand are not so much gene-
alogies as records of events and people whose resonance con-
tinued for much time, so this event, the demise of the CCA 
standard, has affected and continues to impact the development 
of accounting. Oral histories have the capacity to pick up such 
resonances, as in this case where the recall of events is filtered 
through the current consciousness of the participants ten years 
after the events. 
Debate concerning the merits and problems with oral his-
tory methods are a well-trammelled ground for historians over 
the last two decades. Since a 1991 review of the potential for 
oral history in accounting [Collins and Bloom, 1991], there 
have been other advocates of the merits of this method in ac-
counting research. For example, oral history is advocated be-
cause it is a dynamic process which creates evidence about the 
past and allows undocumented perspectives to emerge [Tyson, 
1
 Whakapapa are Maori genealogies relating individuals to various tribes 
and/or ancestors. 
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1996, p . 2]. Because it provides insights into how people felt 
about what happened and focuses on individual experiences, 
reactions, and aspirations, this approach enables participants, 
rather than historians, to reconstruct past events [Allen and 
Montell, 1981, p. 20; Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79; Thomp-
son, 1988, p . 99] and addresses the problem of belief transfer-
ence by the historian [Merino and Mayper, 1993, p. 244; Tyson, 
1996, p. 2]. The multiplicity of experiences of individuals in-
volved in an event such as the CCA debate challenges simple 
causal explanations for the failure of the standard. Hammond 
and Sikka [1996, p. 81] described the potential of oral history 
was to show that "history is a lived experience which is full of 
contradictions, contestation and unforseen consequences." 
Nevertheless, the merits of the methodology are still de-
bated, especially the subjective nature of the testimonies, be-
cause they are complex cultural products [Edwards, 1993, p . 
28]. Specifically, the memory of past events may be subject to 
biased reinterpretation, selective retention, or innocent amne-
sia. In addition, the context in which the interview is under-
taken is very important to the perspective supplied. "We who 
use life stories need to understand . . . they always have to be 
structured, according to known conventions, in order to convey 
the desire . . . of this teller to present a self to the listener, at 
this particular moment" [Tonkin, 1990, p. 34]. 
It is not the purpose of this report to review fully the merits 
and disadvantages of this method. Suffice it to note that the 
oral history approach requires a conscious trade-off between 
the potential and the problems in such a method, given the time 
available and the opportunities presented in the ongoing re-
search process. In this case, the research began in August 1993. 
Assistance from the Oral History Section of the National Li-
brary of New Zealand included the Fyfe and Manson [1991] 
guide, Oral History and How to Approach It, the ethical code 
established by the National Oral History Association of New 
Zealand, the legal release form, and the interviewee informa-
tion sheet which has to accompany any tape deposited in the 
archives. The use of a legal release form at the start of each 
interview was particularly impor tant as it reminded inter-
viewees that their agreements meant tapes and transcripts 
would move into the public domain. All interviewees signed this 
form unconditionally although the form does allow for condi-
tions on release if required. 
An initial approach was made to those who were consid-
ered to be most cognizant of these events. Of the ten men ini-
4
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tially approached or corresponded with, two did not reply. A 
lengthy communication with one potential interviewee, who 
considered that the research should focus only on technical 
aspects of CCA, resulted in his declining the interview for the 
proposed subject matter of this project. After starting the inter-
views, four more interviewees were approached, resulting in 
eleven interviews between August 1993 and February 1994 (see 
Appendix A). The length of interviews varied, most being ap-
proximately one hour. 
It can be observed from Appendix A that the standard set-
ters and academics interviewed formed a homogeneous group 
of New Zealand pakeha2 males. This project did not attempt to 
seek responses from rank-and-file practitioners or from corpo-
rate financial controllers. Although one of the strengths of oral 
history is its capacity to allow other voices (especially of minor-
ity groups) to be heard [Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79], this 
would have resulted in a much extended field of inquiry. 
The objective of this project, as described in the letters to 
interviewees requesting their participation, was to use oral his-
tory techniques in order to contribute to the historical record of 
the CCA debate in New Zealand; in particular, asking about 
recollections or reminiscences of the events surrounding the 
dropping of the CCA standard and how this debate revealed 
aspects of the relationship between practitioners and account-
ing standard-setting authorities between 1975 and 1985. The 
emphasis in the research shifted to the first objective as there 
was little interest by interviewees in the second objective. Com-
ments in response to the questions concerning the second ob-
jective were perfunctory or disinterested. 
The questions asked of each interviewee were: 
1. What events before the standard was promulgated indi-
cated that there might be considerable noncompliance? 
2. What key events caused the withdrawal? 
3. Do you think CCA as an accounting standard is likely to be 
resurrected during other periods of inflation? 
2
 This term means a white/Caucasian New Zealander. The uniformity of 
the gender, race, and status of the subjects meant those interviewed all pro-
vided a sense that they were men living their lives "as their own." This empha-
sis is widely recognized by oral historians; for example, in Bertaux-Wiame's 
[1982, p . 193] study, she noted it was from their work that men derive their 
sense of identity, and present themselves "as the subjects of their own lives — 
as the actors . . . in contrast with men's accounts, women will not insist on 
what they have done; but rather on what relationships existed between them-
selves and persons close to them." 5
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4. What was the impact on the status of the profession? 
5. What does this event tell us about what users want from 
financial statements? 
Interviews progressed in a relatively unstructured manner. 
Sometimes after termination the interviewees would move on 
to personal reminiscences or memories of different individuals 
involved and subsequent events in their lives. In other cases, the 
interviewees would answer largely on the basis of questions 
asked, choosing not to recall or comment on issues they did not 
consider within the scope of the questions. 
Following the copying and transcription of all tapes, a copy 
of the interview was sent to each interviewee with a prog-
ress report in August 1994. Master copies were lodged with a 
copy of transcripts and a project report in the Oral History 
Archives in Wellington, New Zealand upon completion of the 
research. 
The most effective method of analysis was utilization of a 
"cut-and-paste" method, facilitated by holding data in multiple 
files on a computer with duplication marked carefully. This cut-
and-paste into 16 topics reduced the 53,000 plus words in the 
transcripts to about 23,000 words. The responses were then 
reanalyzed to identify commonalities, differences, or particular 
phrases which clearly illustrated responses to the topics. 
The analysis of the transcripts was an emergent, evolving 
process because as segments were identified within the data, 
different connections between segments became apparent. The 
researcher had to reread transcripts, given the new information 
and new structures which were emerging within the data. Sort-
ing and sifting led to seemingly interesting and meaningful dis-
coveries. This process could continue ad infinitum in the ab-
sence of constraints in regards to money, time, or energy. 
During the interviews, the interviewees raised related issues 
including the international context, price controls, the price 
freeze, inflation rates, the achievements and quality of the 
Richardson Report, the personality of the prime minister (Sir 
R. D. Muldoon), the "Waikato Project,"3 and the New Zealand 
Society of Accountants Awards for Annual Reports. 
It is apparent that some other questions could have been 
used as a starting point. For example, the question "Why was 
3
 The Waikato Project on Inflation Accounting published purchasing 
power and price indices, as well as providing education series for practitioners 
and new graduates. 6
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CCA developed in the first place?" might have given a different 
emphasis to their perceptions concerning why the standard was 
eventually withdrawn. However, the original objective of the 
research was to apply theories addressing the issue of the ef-
fect of withdrawal of a standard on the legitimation of the 
profession through its standard-setting process. The emphasis 
was not on the technical aspects of current value accounting. 
During analysis it became apparent that the differences be-
tween the New Zealand and U.K. events were of significance. 
The thesis topic changed from an initial single objective to two 
foci — (1) an examination of the similarities and differences 
between the attributed causes of the failure of the CCA stand-
ard from research at the time, compared with the attributed 
causes from the oral history record; and (2) a comparison of the 
differences between U.K. and New Zealand events. The result-
ing thesis was completed by the end of 1994. 
THE SECOND NARRATIVE: THE CONSTRUCTION AND 
WITHDRAWAL OF THE CCA STANDARD 
A shared characteristic of the second and third narratives is 
the objective to "gather the data and present them in such a 
manner that 'the informants speak for themselves'" [Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990, p. 21]. The resulting presentation of chunks 
of transcript inserted into text allows to every degree possible 
the spontaneous and meaningful ways in which the inter-
viewees' memories were expressed. 
The second narrative commenced a considerable time be-
fore the research started in 1993. In 1967, the Consumer Price 
Index in New Zealand started to record annual changes over 
4%, the s tar t of a long period of steadily increasing inflation. It 
did not fall below this level again until 1991. The start of the 
CCA project was linked in interviewees' minds to this inflation 
of price indices. The rapid increase was considered to be the 
driver behind efforts which led to the promulgation of the 
standard, and a subsequent perceived decrease was considered 
(by some people) the cause of its failure. Eventually, the Con-
sumer Price Index in New Zealand increased from 6-7% per 
annum in 1970 to 17% in 1980. 
A n u m b e r of countr ies publ ished Current Purchas ing 
Power (CPP) proposals throughout the 1970s. In Australia, the 
Current Value Accounting exposure draft was based on revalua-
tion to replacement cost. When inflation rose sharply in the 
U.S. in the 1970s, the Securities and Exchange Commission and 7
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the Financial Accounting Standards Board in SFAS 33 required 
supplementary statements, comprising a "real terms" mixture 
of replacement cost and purchasing-power data. In January 
1974, the U.K. Sandilands Committee was appointed, reporting 
back on inflation accounting in June 1975. In the U.K., the 
deliberations of the Morpeth Committee resulted in the devel-
opment by the Accounting Standards Committee of ED 18, 
eventually promulgated as SSAP 7. 
ED 10, Accounting for the Changes in the Purchasing Power 
of Money, was the first exposure draft published by the New 
Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA) in March 1975. The 
draft was largely based on the U.K. SSAP 7 and similarly rec-
ommended the CPP approach. Inflation was over 10% per an-
num in New Zealand between 1975 and 1988, with the excep-
tion of the years in which the government initiated a price 
freeze (mid-1982-1984). In March 1976, an analysis of the re-
sponses to ED 10 was published in the New Zealand Ac-
countants Journal. It was clear that the vast majority of re-
spondents were opposed to CPP, with some responden t s 
preferring to wait and see what was going to happen overseas. 
Others urged that more research should be undertaken in New 
Zealand or suggested there would be confusion over presenting 
two sets of financial statements to shareholders, as required by 
ED 10. Overall, the CPP method was seen as being seriously 
deficient although many agreed that it was a step in the right 
direction. 
The National Party in New Zealand won the 1975 elections 
under the leadership of Rob Muldoon, who was duly declared 
prime minister. Muldoon was particularly remembered for be-
ing of strong character, and the significance of his opposition 
to attempts to establish the CCA standard for taxable income 
measurement after the standard as promulgated was frequently 
mentioned by interviewees because he was an accountant and 
had given support to efforts in the 1970s to develop a form of 
inflation accounting. 
ED 14, Accounting in Terms of Current Costs and Values, 
published in March 1976, recommended that assets should be 
shown in the balance sheet at their "value to the business," and 
profit should be the result of matching costs with revenues, 
both expressed in current terms. 
The Americans . . . experimented by having some of the 
big companies disclose the current values of their as-
sets and, in other words, I think they probably had a 
very sensible approach in that they tried to do it incre- 8
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mentally. Whereas we tried to do it, not only us, but 
the U.K. and to some extent Australia, tried to go in 
boots and all; whereas they just said 'No, let's experi-
ment with the valuation, you disclose the current val-
ues of your assets,' and I think it just became more 
apparent that that was a stumbling block. It is a very 
basic one [Frank Devonport].4 
In September 1976, the Richardson Committee, a commit-
tee appointed by the National Government, released the Report 
of the Committee of Inquiry into Inflation Accounting. Consider-
ing CPP, CCA, and Continuously Contemporaneous Accounting 
(CoCoA), the report recommended that some form of CCA be 
required. The inflation rate was then close to 17%. In December 
that year, the prime minister pledged support for the Waikato 
Inflation Accounting Research Project. The project was ex-
tended to t ra in potent ial and new employees (account ing 
graduates) of 120 companies in different "inflation accounting" 
methods. 
Throughout 1977 and 1978, the NZSA increased its involve-
ment in "inflation accounting" education through publications 
in the Accountants Journal and by offering seminars on CCA in 
May 1977. However, it was not until December 1978 that GU 1, 
Supplementary Financial Statements in Terms of Current Costs 
and Values, was published by the NZSA. GU 1 followed the 
Richardson Report recommendations very closely. 
Parallel to these events was the publication of "inflation 
accounting" standards elsewhere — SFAS 33, Financial Report-
ing and Changing Prices, was promulgated in the U.S. in 1979, 
and in 1980 SSAP 16, Current Cost Accounting, was promul-
gated in the U.K. In New Zealand there were signs of resistance 
to change and concern with the immediate effects of CCA on 
company profits and taxation revenue. 
At the end of 1980, there was a plea by the chairman of the 
Accounting and Research Standards Board, Malcolm McCaw, 
to members of the NZSA to maintain the commitment to devel-
oping a CCA standard. He said, "despite uncertainty in the 
problems of transition it was essential for the Society to take a 
firm step in the interests of the public, investors and those who 
protected investors" [McCaw, 1980, p . 40]. Members were also 
reminded that many accountants now considered that historic 
4
 Readers are referred to Appendix A for a description of the careers of the 
interviewees. 
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cost accounts were not sufficient to satisfy legal requirements 
for a "true and fair view." 
In response to GU 1, ED 25, Current Cost Accounting, was 
prepared. Although it was very similar to the recommendation 
of the Richardson Report and to the U.K. SSAP 16, a major 
difference compared with SSAP 16 occurred in the calculation 
of the gearing adjustment which took into account revaluation 
surpluses on fixed assets. 
Seven months later in March 1982, CCA 1, Information Re-
flecting the Effects of Changing Prices, was published by the 
NZSA. It was almost identical to ED 25 and followed the U.K. 
SSAP 16 in almost all respects excepting the composition of 
monetary working capital and the current cost reserve items to 
which the gearing adjustment was to be applied. 
The awareness of the levels of noncompliance led to the 
offering of a one-day series of workshops and the distribution 
of a 20-minute video distributed through the NZSA. However, 
in the first major analysis of 147 companies with a financial 
year ending around March 1983 [Peterson et al., 1984], there 
was only an 8.2% compliance rate. A further study [Cameron 
and Heazlewood, 1985] noted an 8.6% compliance rate with 
CCA 1 in the reports of 185 companies for reporting periods 
ending between the end of March 1983 and February 1984. The 
price freeze through price controls was continued for only a 
few months after the Labour Party won the election in July 
1983. Inflation rates during the freeze had been 6-7%. Inflation 
rose again to 13-15% for three years before the sharemarket 
"crash" in October 1987. 
Two years later in October 1985, the NZSA decided that the 
"standard" status of CCA 1 should be dropped, and that it 
should be reduced in status to "recommended best practice." In 
the U.K., SSAP 16 was also made nonmandatory. ED 38, Ac-
counting for the Effects of Changing Prices, was developed to 
replace ED 35 in the U.K., but eventually was not formally 
issued. SFAS 33 was being reassessed in the U.S. 
It's very difficult for a country, both for the profession 
internationally and for the Government, to go down 
one path where everyone else is standing still, or going 
off somewhere else. . . . It's not a field in which New 
Zealand can go it alone [Sir Ivor Richardson]. 
This narrative of the events indicates standard setting was 
seen as a process whereby those controlling the standard set-
ting wished to achieve a public good by improving financial 
10
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reporting, but lost their "battle" because of factors beyond their 
control, such as international events. 
I think we did a better job than any of the other coun-
tries. The English, Scots had got sorely embarrassed by 
their weak-kneed approach to the whole thing, they 
lost the vote and so on and they couldn't even control 
their own members. . . . The Australians never covered 
themselves with glory at any stage. They probably were 
rather pragmatic I suppose, they were aware that there 
was no great enthusiasm out there in the profession, 
certainly not amongst the companies, the companies 
are the last people that wanted to be saddled with cur-
rent cost accounting. . . . The Australians really fooled 
around with it and didn't do a great deal [Rex Ander-
son]. 
New Zealand provided a scenario which was alternatively 
described as being "an experimental niche" or "we couldn't do it 
alone," typical of a cultural ambivalence common to many as-
pects of New Zealand cultural or intellectual developments. It 
became apparent in the process of the research that the drivers 
to the rise and withdrawal of the New Zealand standard were 
far more influenced by international events than indicated by 
company reports in that period. 
These drivers were different from those identified for the 
U.K., where the rise in domest ic inflation triggered wha t 
Mumford [1979, p. 98] described as a five-year cycle of events, 
ending with a reduction in domestic inflation and interest in 
reform dwindling. In the U.S., SFAS 33 had required supple-
mentary disclosures to reflect CCA, but did not require a re-
vised balance sheet. There were disagreements in the U.S. con-
cerning the t r ea tment of mone ta ry i tems and cont inuing 
opposition from practitioners. Inflation had fallen to 3.2% in 
1983 [Kirkman, 1985, p. 37], and the promised review after five 
years did not eventuate. 
THE THIRD NARRATIVE: CAUSES OF THE FAILURE 
OF THE CCA STANDARD 
The third narrative is focused on the construction of a de-
scription of similarities and differences between the attributed 
causes of the failure of the CCA standard in research in pub-
lished articles at the time, compared with the attributed causes 
from the oral history record. This comparison of the two 
sources demonstrates that utilization of oral history methods 
11
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provides a valuable and unique perspective which contrasts 
with that provided from analyses of written data and company 
reports. 
The Account of Causes of Failure in Published Articles: There 
were two initial studies of annual reports to identify the attrib-
uted causes of noncompliance. Peterson et al. [1984] evaluated 
the response to CCA 1 after the publication of 147 major corpo-
rate annual reports for the next reporting period ending on or 
after March 31, 1983. This study followed the adoption of the 
standard by the NZSA in 1982. Of these 147 companies, only 
8.2% published supplementary current-cost accounts. Cameron 
and Heazlewood [1985] also analyzed reports for all accounting 
periods commencing on or after April 1, 1982 (totaling 185 
listed companies) and found an overall compliance rate of 
8.6%. The major reasons given for the lack of adoption of CCA 
in these research investigations were: 
1. The benefit of CCA was questioned. This reason was vari-
ously stated: "served little practical or useful purpose," "not 
warranted, confusing, misleading, not cost/beneficial, was 
inappropriate," "gave no meaningful information." This 
reason was cited by 49% of companies in the Cameron and 
Heazlewood [1985] study and 27% in Peterson et al. [1984]. 
2. There was subjectivity and complexity in CCA according to 
3 1 % of the companies studied by Cameron and Heazle-
wood and 24% in Peterson et al. CCA was seen as lacking 
understandability and not enhancing comparability. The 
use of price indices and multiple alternative approaches 
was seen as confusing. 
3. CCA was not mandatory, was not recognized for tax or 
pricing purposes, and was not a Stock Exchange require-
ment. 2 1 % of reports in both the Cameron and Heazlewood 
and the Peterson et al. studies suggested it was being ig-
nored because it did not have legal, fiscal, or economic 
validity. 
4. There was a failure by other public companies to follow the 
standard, a reason indicated in the Freightways Report 
[Peterson et al., 1984, p. 90]. 
In only one case in the Peterson et al. [1984] survey did a 
company mention that the system was not relevant because of 
the "declining" inflation rate, while 3 of the 72 companies 
in the Cameron and Heazlewood study [1985] noted this reason 
for noncompliance. The artificial decline in the inflation rate 
12
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was caused by the wage and price freeze. Further details of the 
Cameron and Heazlewood results are provided in Appendix B. 
Peterson et al. [1984, p. 91] found it "difficult to accept that 
the reasons mentioned are valid ones for failure to comply with 
the standard." In their view, the primary reason was that CCA 
results in a reduction in reported profits, thus negatively affect-
ing share prices and terms of loan finance. This view was sub-
stantiated by comments from the oral history interviews which 
indicated that management did not want to be seen in a bad 
light. For example, Bob Pope observed, "There were others who 
did not like it because it did in fact portray a much poorer 
result in most cases." 
The results of these two studies were supplemented by 
Wong's 1988 research into 15 New Zealand companies which 
utilized CCA to provide supplementary information to the fi-
nancial accounts during the period from 1977-1981 (i.e., while 
CCA was voluntary). These entities showed higher effective tax 
rates, lower leverage, larger market capitalization, and more 
capital intensity. All these results are consistent with positivist 
theories which focus on incentives to change accounting poli-
cies. 
Reviewing the causes of noncompliance, Cowan [1985, p . 
52] divided the opinions of the accounting profession into two 
groups, those who thought CCA was now a lost cause and those 
who attributed its failure to lack of support from others inside 
and outside the profession. He attributed the noncompliance to 
the following factors: 
1. The proposals were not successful because New Zealand 
had not considered an independent "locally developed" so-
lution but had tried to improvise from methods of account-
ing for inflation advocated in other jurisdictions [Cowan, 
1985, p. 53]. 
2. There were frustrated hopes as some preparers anticipated 
that they would initially provide supplementary informa-
tion using CCA rather than replacing historic-cost-based 
financial reports. Subsequently, when CCA was proven to 
be a fully workable standard, it would then replace the 
modified historic-cost basis. The lack of compliance frus-
trated this objective [Cowan, 1985, p. 53]. 
3. The NZSA had failed to appreciate its role in mediating 
between theoretical or academic purists, and there were 
constraints experienced by pract i t ioners in applying a 
13
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standard which may have been theoretically pure but was 
too subjective for practitioners. 
4. There were seen to be defects in the CCA model. It was too 
subjective, limited in scope, too complex, and not inte-
grated closely enough with previous techniques of asset 
measurement. 
Cowan [1985, p . 52] argued that the profession had to con-
tinue its advocacy of some system of inflation accounting in 
order to mitigate the extreme misinformation flowing out of 
accounts based on historic cost, even if it meant adjusting the 
"product" to meet the needs of "consumers." "This is no time to 
give up on inflation accounting. The problem which it ad-
dresses is much too serious." By then, virtually everyone else 
had turned their backs on the proposals, and his pleas were 
largely ignored. 
Reasons for Noncompliance from the Oral History: The perceived 
causes of noncompliance from oral history tapes are listed be-
low, with the more frequently described factors listed first: 
1. CCA was not going to be permitted to be used for the calcu-
lation of taxable income after companies had seen it as a 
mechanism to reduce taxable income. This cause was cited 
by Frank Devonport, John Hagen, Roger Hopkins, Bob 
Pope, Malcolm McCaw, Don Trow, and John Hagen. A re-
lated view was that the Government had not given a strong 
enough signal of support, such as endorsement by the Se-
curities Commission (noted by Rex Anderson, Malcolm 
McCaw, and Bob Pope): 
Well, no government was prepared to say they had 
a tax rate of 900 in the dollar. If they accepted that 
current cost accounting was the proper basis for 
reporting financial accounts and for taxation levy, 
they couldn't drop their tax bills, so they would 
have had to, or adjust the tax base in some other 
way, they were just not prepared to do it. It was 
politically unacceptable. That was the crux of the 
matter [Bob Pope]. 
If Muldoon had said you could have had it for tax, 
then probably it would have rolled in. . . . People 
would think they had got a big reduction in tax 
[Frank Devonport]. 
Although it was recognized: 
14
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We felt obliged to make some modifications to CCA 
for financial reporting purposes for pragmatic tax 
reasons. For example, if we had applied CCA across 
the board for tax purposes there would have been 
an element of taxation of capital gains. We felt that 
really in the climate of the times that that would 
not be acceptable across the board to the public; 
and so we adopted a compromise of recognising for 
tax purposes the benefits of the use of borrowed 
funds, but only up to the point of the CCA deduc-
tions in other respects [Sir Ivor Richardson]. 
2. CCA was either too complicated or complex, or it was too 
radical and too fundamental a change, mentioned by John 
Hagen, Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins, and Rex Ander-
son: 
It was more a growing belief by the business com-
munity or the financial community generally saying 
'This was too complicated. We don't understand it.' 
There was a sort of gathering storm of protest say-
ing: 'Too complicated' [John Hagen]. 
This standard was the first one which drove to the 
hear t of the measurement process, and I think 
again fundamentally that was something that the 
Society couldn't handle, it was new to them. Here 
we were putting up a Standard, which said you are 
going to have to measure things a different way. It 
is not a question of disclosure and reporting, not a 
question of how you analyse and classify and report 
to people, you are going to have to measure it dif-
ferently and this cut right to the core of the ac-
cepted thinking [Roger Hopkins]. 
3. CCA was not adopted because it showed a lower profit (as 
noted by Malcolm McCaw) and reported less favorable re-
sults (according to John Hagen, Athol Mann, and Don 
Trow): 
The proposal not to use it for tax purposes was the 
thrust of the dagger into the body of CCA that took 
the life out of it. People had not realised, I don't 
think, that that was the moment that CCA died, es-
pecially accountants who were keen to box on; and 
I think, naively, accountants got a bit of surprise 
when they found company directors did just not 
want to produce CCA accounts, because it was con-
trary to what they had said they were going to do, 
15
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and one hadn't appreciated that these directors, as 
they always are, always had been particularly in 
those days, always wanting to show themselves as 
good performers, never wanting to attract criticism, 
always taking steps to minimise criticism....There is 
no way that company directors in general were go-
ing to produce CCA information, particularly if say 
only a third of the companies were going to do it, 
because their result was invariably going to be a 
worse result; it would have been the very odd com-
pany that might have had a better result, and they 
didn't just want to put themselves into the category 
of those who very clearly had a inferior result [Don 
Trow]. 
4. One reason given was that inflation elsewhere was falling 
(John Hagen), falling in New Zealand (Malcolm McCaw), 
or ceased to have the impact it had had on "true and fair" 
(Bob Pope): 
Then inflation round the world started to reduce, 
and pressure for current cost data reduced. Unfor-
tunately the battle was lost [John Hagen]. 
Inflation disappeared or ceased to have the impact 
that it was previously having on true and fair re-
porting [Bob Pope]. 
5. Another reason was that the indices were too subjective 
(noted by Frank Devonport and Malcolm McCaw): 
We have still got exactly the same problem that was 
being faced then. This was the problem of measure-
ment . You see, even today we are advocat ing 
valuers to value or revalue assets and the valuers 
are scrambling to try and produce a set of stand-
ards for valuation. You can go to two different 
valuers to get the valuation you want. They differ so 
much, and I think this is basically the same prob-
lem as you had with CCA [Frank Devonport]. 
6. John Hagen and Athol Mann considered that noncompli-
ance will follow if the market does not like the standard: 
If I adopted CCA and you didn't, the numbers we 
reported were distorted in the minds of the public 
and to some extent by company directors; they said 
'There are not sufficient companies using it, so 
therefore we are going to stop using it, because it 
shows us in a bad light even though we really do 
16
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understand it and agree it was the right thing to do' 
[John Hagen]. 
7. Roger Hopkins and Rex Anderson thought it had been too 
cumbersome and costly: 
It was going to take resources and would cost 
money to produce something that nobody really 
saw any great use of [Rex Anderson]. 
8. John Hagen described one of the causes as a case of the 
theory being "miles ahead" of the practice: 
It was a good example of a standard . . . the imple-
mentat ion of an accounting s tandard where the 
theory was miles ahead of the practice and the aca-
demic part of the profession was miles ahead of the 
companies, and there was no intention to take ac-
count of politics in accounting s tandards. . . . I 
think it is because the standard setters at that time 
did not comprehend sufficiently, in any way, that 
you cannot jam standards down peoples throats 
and hope they will accept them. And if they don't 
like them, then the business community will scuttle 
them. 
9. Roger Hopkins noted that we had learned to live with 
(modified) historic cost and allow for it: 
They know how, for instance, allowances for depre-
ciation on historical cost are not going to allow for 
the cost of replacement, but they know that and 
understand it and they make, just as the corporate 
director used to do, the necessary adjustments, if 
they want to transfer from that model into the real 
world of decision making. 
10. A further factor was conservative boards of directors: 
I was sure in those days that a lot of Boards of 
Directors just didn't want to even think about it. 
They just didn't want to go through the hassle of 
understanding what it was all about . . . (there was) 
a desire to keep on the old ways, and, as I say, there 
were a lot of members of our profession who gave 
them some support too. . . . I think probably those 
of us who were keen on it were so enthused with it 
that we assumed that we had the right answer, and 
everybody was going to abide by this [Bruce Christ-
mas] . 
17
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11. Malcolm McCaw recalled that New Zealand was seen as an 
"experimental niche:" 
A lot of people overseas thought we were an inter-
esting little experimental niche out there, and they 
were interested to see what happened. In the mean-
time they weren't going to do anything; and banks 
and those sort who would have been the ones to 
benefit from this sort of policy, because they had 
their own ways of working out, working out the 
accounts and making adjustments to those fore-
casts to decide on companies and their future pros-
pects et cetera. 
12. Tony van Zijl considered that it was realized that the use-
fulness of the incremental information was close to zero: 
Well, I think one of the things that happened was 
that people started doing empirical research on the 
incremental information content of that kind of in-
formation, and the consensus that emerged from 
that was that it probably was close to zero. Now 
tha t doesn' t mean to say tha t the informat ion 
wasn't of any value, but rather that there were prob-
ably alternative sources for that information, so 
that in terms, anyway, of usefulness to investors, 
the information rated very low. 
13. According to Athol Mann, companies would not utilize CCA 
if their competitors were not: 
In the interests of their own company, people sim-
ply weren't prepared to make a conversion unless 
their competitors did, they couldn't afford, they felt, 
to leave themselves out on a limb in relation to 
accounts published under a CCA approach if their 
competi tors in the same industry didn't do the 
same. 
14. Rex Anderson recalled that at that time academics were 
more inclined to continue debating rather than resolve the 
issues: 
The last thing they want to happen in an academic 
argument, is for resolution to be reached. It's a 
plaything, they like to go on; and the fact that 
somebody knowledgeable by propounding his views 
can slow the whole process down, in fact ruin it, 
doesn't worry them, provided that they get their 
own way. 
18
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DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE 
EXPLANATIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE 
The data presented in the oral history narrative show a 
variety of viewpoints, some of which provide an understanding 
different from the existing consensus in the literature on the 
causes of the failure of the inflation accounting standard in 
New Zealand. Readers will develop their own comparisons 
from the information provided and existing knowledge of expla-
nations for the failure of such standards. This account will 
therefore enable readers to develop further their own under-
standing of these events, given their individual preferences for 
any weighting they may wish to place on the different sources. 
The two sources are of a very different nature, resulting in 
very different emphases. Most of the emphases from insights 
provided by the oral histories were on political or contracting 
costs, whereas the emphases from annual reports analyses were 
on comparability, costliness, and usefulness. Although there 
may be distortions from the effect of memory in oral history, 
other sources of data have different problems of selectivity and 
partiality. However imperfect sources may be, the comparison 
is illuminating. 
The comparison between the analysis of the reasons for 
noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985 and the oral 
histories shows the major similarity in these two sources is the 
"tax issue." Standard setters looked back with hindsight and 
determined that the lack of CCA 1 acceptance for taxation pur-
poses was its "death sentence." Comments were often phrased 
in the death metaphor. 
The major difference was a compelling insistence, espe-
cially in the comments of Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins, 
Rex Anderson, and John Hagen, that CCA was a fundamental 
change in the approach to the measurement of income. If one is 
expecting people's behavior to change (which it should do in 
the light of a changed standard), then there are major political 
considerations inherent in the standard-setting process which 
have to be taken into account. This point was most emphasized 
by John Hagen. The analysis closer to the events, as cited, sug-
gested that CCA was "just another s tandard" being imple-
mented, although some standard setters, on reflection, clearly 
saw it as being essentially different to other new accounting 
standards because of the extent to which it represented a funda-
mental change in accounting principles. The CCA standard was 
part of the normative system of standard setting, as Kirk [1988, 
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p. 17] noted, "a normative system, however, has definite limits 
in its ability to point a policy-making body toward incontrovert-
ible solutions to recognition and measurement problems. Good 
intentions and hard work cannot overcome those limits." 
Other reasons derived from the published analyses of the 
reasons for noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985 
also appear in the standard-setters' perceptions. In addition, the 
oral history reflected memories of an increasing lack of com-
mitment by practitioners, and that CCA would reflect negatively 
the performance of directors and managers. There were no sig-
nificant differences in the views of those interviewees who had 
been in public practice comp>ared with those who had led 
largely academic careers. 
It was also noted by interviewees that directors of larger 
multinational companies in New Zealand were prepared to 
"give it a go" in the early stages of the development of CCA, 
which may be indicative that the thrust to international harmo-
nization was contributing to early support for the standard 
from the corporate sector. Eventually the lack of compliance 
overseas, coupled with the anticipated fall in inflation driven by 
a drop in inflation in New Zealand's major trading partners, 
was driving noncompliance in 1982-1983. 
This contrasting analysis has highlighted that the reasons 
provided by companies for not utilizing the CCA standard are 
not all reflected in the reasons as understood by the standard 
setters. It could be expected that companies would not attribute 
noncompliance to the desire not to show management perform-
ance in a "bad light," or that it was too radical or too funda-
mental a change. It is of note that very few company reports 
referred to the anticipated fall in inflation or the political (price 
freeze) environment. 
This comparison has demonstrated the usefulness of oral 
history methods to identify contrasting dynamics behind stan-
dard setting where hegemonic forces may elude quantitative 
analysis. Oral histories may not result in major revisions, yet 
still "add value" to the extant records of an accounting phenom-
enon. 
SEPARATION AND RECONSTITUTION 
It is in our nature to reconstitute separate pieces of infor-
mation into a coherent body of knowledge. The separation of 
this accounting history research into three narratives was not 
undertaken in order to prevent the coherency of such reconsti-
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tution, but to demonstrate the inevitability of the imposition of 
narrative in interpretative or explanatory paradigms. 
Thus, the first narrative related the progress and comple-
tion of a successful research project. A feature of this research 
was the change in the eventual focus for the thesis. This revised 
focus was the outcome of the usually undocumented process of 
ensuring appropriate scope and coherency to the ultimate re-
search report. It can be assumed that the questions asked of 
interviewees would have been different if the eventual focus of 
the research had been differently identified to interviewees at 
the start. However, if scholars had to remain on an unalterable 
trajectory, the potential for discovery from data could be com-
promised or endangered. The potential of methods such as oral 
history is to allow the data to reveal hypotheses previously un-
anticipated by the researcher, typical of grounded theory where 
the theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenom-
enon it represents [Strauss and Corbin, 1990]. 
Some refusal to participate as described was not unusual in 
such projects and reflects issues of control over the topic. It is 
difficult to determine to what extent there was bias in the selec-
tion of participants, but the resultant data indicated a breadth 
of views was obtained. 
The second narrative related the rise and fall of the stand-
ard in a series of attempts by the standard setters which were 
ultimately unsuccessful. The interviews revealed an importance 
of the international context previously unrecognized in New 
Zealand studies of the failure of the CCA standard [Peterson et 
al., 1984; Cameron and Heazlewood, 1985; Cowan, 1985; Wong, 
1988]. Economic pressures, in particular the inflation rate, 
were observed to have less impact on the failure of the CCA 
standard in New Zealand compared with other jurisdictions. 
The third narrative combined archival data (written expla-
nations for the failure) with the oral history data in order to 
make a comparison. As such, it transversed the two paradigms 
of accounting history as described by Tyson [1996, p. 2]. To 
study causes of lack of compliance is typical of accounting his-
tory studies with an objective of ensuring the utility of account-
ing history. The third narrative reflected that standard setters 
consider there are "lessons to be learned" from the failure of 
the standard. Historical studies should provide a record of past 
experiences which help in current standard-setting issues; yet, 
standard setters continue to attempt to disconnect the CCA epi-
sode from current standard setting. For example, recently in the 
U.K. the ASB announced in the progress paper on the exposure 
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draft of the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting 
that, "The Board emphatically states that it has never had any 
plans to impose a system of current cost accounting. . . " [Ac-
counting Standards Board, 1996, p. 1] in response to many 
expressions of concern that the ASB was trying to reestablish 
CCA. Such strong denial of any likely role for CCA in future 
standard setting indicates negative resonance from past events 
is ongoing. 
CONCLUSION 
The isolation of the three components of this research into 
separate narratives implies each has now been completed, but 
in reality all three are ongoing. The data could sustain new 
research outputs as the debate about current value accounting 
is ongoing in New Zealand and elsewhere. The composition and 
understanding of these events might also undergo reexamina-
tion and recomposition in the minds of those involved in the 
events 20 years ago. 
Narratives were chosen because they provide a flexible tool 
with which to communicate events; narrative is not characteris-
tic of particular fields of research. It may be less explicit in the 
traditional scientific method of research description, but the 
most rigorous scientific procedures for establishing a method 
of scientific testing are sequential in structure and in the re-
porting thereof. It would have been possible to build up at least 
six or eight narratives, like the layers of an onion, in order to 
report fully this study of the failure of the CCA standard in New 
Zealand. The richness from this record is to be found not in any 
inner kernel of truth, but in the process of reaching the inner-
most layer as each narrative is read and contextualized, allow-
ing its constitutive effect to be appreciated. 
Results presented in this manner highlight that any such 
research is a series of interlocking and overlapping events. Nar-
rative is not only a direct and efficient means of communicat-
ing both causal and transactional elements in events, but also 
clearly delineates delusions and failures. It is a limitation of 
narrative that the conceptual complexity of events is simplified 
into a singular process, but such limitations assist communica-
tion and comprehension. 
The tool of narrative has sometimes been transformed into 
a metaphor for "whiggish" tendencies of history — tendencies 
to highlight successful endeavors which contributed to the as-
cendancy of the present while casting past failures into unre-
22
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corded shadows. Undoubtedly narrative has been constructed 
to this end, but such uses should not exclude recognition of its 
value, or indeed its inevitability, in explanatory or interpretative 
paradigms. 
This study has provided an example validating Carnegie 
and Napier's [1996, p. 8] view that the strengths of accounting 
history are from its firm basis in the "archive," which includes 
the oral records here presented. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
that "accounting history is enhanced by locating our narratives 
within an understanding of the specific context in which the 
object of our research emerges and operates." Such enrichment, 
through an increasing contribution of oral history studies in 
different jurisdictions, will ensure a fertile database for future 
accounting history studies. 
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APPENDIX B 
Reasons for Noncompliance from 
Analyses of Company Reports 
The following summary is from the study by Cameron and Heazlewood [1985]. 
Their study of 185 company reports with reporting dates between 3/31/83 -
2/29/84 overlapped reports studied by Peterson et al. [1984]. In the Cameron 
and Heazlewood study: 
CCA mentioned but no reason given for 
noninclusion 
CCA mentioned and reasons given for 
noninclusion 
CCA not mentioned 
Companies presenting CCA statements 
Total 












Of the 72 reports which disclosed reasons for noncompliance, 108 reasons 
were given: 
CCA serves little or no purpose. 
CCA is not recognized for tax purposes. 
CCA is confusing or misleading to members. 
Application of CCA to the company's results would not be 
appropriate. 
CCA methods are too subjective. 
There is as yet no agreed uniform method of accounting for 
changes in price levels. 
CCA statements were prepared but not presented. 
CCA will not be implemented until it is more widely understood 
and accepted. 
Time spent on CCA is not cost-beneficial. 
CCA is not warranted. 
Primary accounts already reflect CCA principles in some form 
or another. 
CCA is no longer valid now that the rate of inflation has dropped. 
CCA is not recognized for pricing purposes. 
CCA results do not allow comparability. 
CCA is not a legal requirement. 
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